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VEXATIOUS LITIGANTS AND THE ADA:
STRATEGIES TO FAIRLY ADDRESS THE
NEED TO IMPROVE ACCESS FOR
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
Helia Garrido Hull*
The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) is recognized as one
of the most significant pieces of civil rights legislation in American history and is aimed at protecting the rights of individuals with disabilities.
Unfortunately, as the ADA has developed, some attorneys have exposed
methods of exploiting the provisions of the ADA for personal, pecuniary
benefits—fee-driven lawsuits for violations of plaintiff-friendly provisions of Title III of the ADA. As a result of this exploitation, record numbers of Title III disability cases are being filed by a small group of
plaintiffs and attorneys who have created a lucrative “cottage industry”
of vexatious and profitable lawsuits that do little to protect individuals
with disabilities or promote the spirit and purpose of the ADA.
Vexatious ADA litigation frequently occurs under the guise of a
meritorious suit ostensibly brought on behalf of an individual with a disability who is seeking equal access to public accommodations. However,
once the lawsuit is filed it quickly devolves into a hunt for vulnerable
small businesses that are not in full compliance with the ADA. By exploiting small businesses that are likely to settle quickly instead of engaging in lengthy, costly litigation, lawyers bringing these cases are able
to quickly recover attorney’s fees. The profitability and ease with which
these lawsuits can be brought has prompted some attorneys to find and
file as many ADA violation suits as possible. While the attorneys generate high profits from these lawsuits, money is diverted away from the
real need—correcting the underlying violation that justified the lawsuit
and providing the disabled plaintiff with equality and accessibility.
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This Article addresses the need to reform the ADA to prevent vexatious litigation and to promote the underlying goals of the Act. Part I of
this Article introduces the topic of vexatious litigation and the importance of remedying the effects of exploitation of the ADA. Part II provides an overview of the ADA and its efforts to increase accessibility to
individuals with disabilities, emphasizing the provisions of the Act that
create incentives to engage in vexatious litigation. Part III examines and
analyzes the judiciary’s response to vexatious litigation under the ADA,
and sanctions that have been issued to limit exploitation. Finally, Part IV
provides recommendations to reform the ADA and state disability law
counterparts, suggests corrective actions to address vexatious litigation,
and identifies methods to promote equality for individuals with
disabilities.
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INTRODUCTION
“At his best, man is the noblest of all the animals; separated from law and justice he is the worst.”1
On July 26, 1990, President George H.W. Bush signed into law the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).2 The Act was intended to provide equal opportunities for people with disabilities to participate in
mainstream American life.3 Today, the ADA is recognized as one of the
most significant pieces of civil rights legislation in American history.4
The Act prohibits discrimination and guarantees that individuals with
1

RICHARD ALAN KRIEGER, CIVILIZATION’S QUOTATIONS: LIFE’S IDEAL 255 (2002).
Introduction to the ADA, ADA.GOV, http://www.ada.gov/ada_intro.htm (last visited
Apr. 18, 2016).
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012) (“The purpose of the ADA is to: 1) provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities; (2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a
central role in enforcing the standards established in this Act on behalf of individuals with
disabilities; and (4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major
areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.”).
4 ADA.GOV, supra note 2.
2
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disabilities are treated equally in the areas of employment, public accommodations, state and local government services, and telecommunications.5 Passage of the ADA was made possible through the efforts of
countless contributors to the disabilities rights movement whose collective actions made individuals with disabilities, and the injustices they
faced, more visible to society.6
Attorneys played a critical role in developing the ADA and many of
the rights now enjoyed by individuals with disabilities.7 Today, however,
some attorneys are exploiting provisions within the ADA, and related
laws, for personal monetary gain by filing self-serving, fee-driven lawsuits that often do not advance the rights of individuals with disabilities.8
This is particularly true for lawsuits brought for violations of the more
plaintiff-friendly provisions of Title III of the ADA.9 In recent years,
record numbers of Title III ADA disability access cases have been filed
by a small group of plaintiffs and lawyers who have collaborated to create a profitable “cottage industry” of fee-driven lawsuits that do little to
improve accessibility for individuals with disabilities.10 In the most egregious schemes, a litigious, disabled plaintiff collaborates with an unscrupulous lawyer or law firm to aggressively seek out ADA violations at
public accommodations.11 Then, without ever informing the business of
the ADA violations, or attempting to remedy the matter through conciliation and voluntary compliance, the lawyer files suit on behalf of the disabled plaintiff requesting damages for each identified violation.12
Threatened with costly litigation that could potentially force targeted establishments out of business, many businesses quickly settle the matter.13
In 2014, there was a sixty-three percent increase in the number of
ADA Title III lawsuits (4436) filed, most filed by the same plaintiffs
5 28 C.F.R. § 35 (2015); ADA.GOV, supra note 2; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2012)
(“No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any
place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a
place of public accommodation.”).
6 ADA.GOV, supra note 2.
7 See id.
8 Amy Shipley & John Maines, South Florida Leads Nation in Controversial Disability
Lawsuits, SUN SENTINEL (Jan. 11, 2014), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2014-01-11/news/fldisability-lawsuits-strike-sf-20140112_1_plaintiffs-attorneys-lawsuits.
9 Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1826–27 (2005) (“According to an ABA study in 2003, Title I
cases had defendants win 97.3% of the time. Titles II and III appear to be more pro-plaintiff.”).
10 Rodriguez v. Investco, L.L.C., 305 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1280–82 (M.D. Fla. 2004); see
also Shipley & Maines, supra note 8.
11 Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 347 F. Supp. 2d 860, 862–63 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
12 Id. at 862 (citing Investco, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1280–81).
13 Id. at 862–63.
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using the same attorneys.14 Plaintiffs continued to file large numbers of
lawsuits in 2015.15 In California, Florida, New York, Texas, and Arizona
alone, plaintiffs filed 3,847 ADA Title III lawsuits.16 These lawsuits are
brought under the guise of serving individuals with disabilities by forcing
reluctant business owners to meet accommodation standards required
under the ADA. However, increasingly the lawsuits are driven by the
availability of attorney’s fees and the ease of obtaining such fees from
entities being sued.17 Often, attorneys bringing the lawsuits are paid fees
and costs while the underlying ADA violation that gave rise to the suit is
left uncorrected.18 For some businesses, these lawsuits take away the
money needed to correct the underlying violation that justified the
lawsuit.19
The increase in filing of ADA Title III cases has caused some courts
to consider whose interests are really being served by the lawsuits: the
client’s or the attorney’s. In some instances, the misuse of the ADA or
related state disability laws for monetary gain, has been so egregious that
judges have responded by entering orders restricting an individual’s or
attorney’s right to bring a legal action for an alleged violation of the
ADA. This Article provides insight into the troubling misuse of the ADA
for personal monetary gain, and offers recommendations that will help
minimize abuse of existing law while promoting accessibility for individuals with disabilities. Section I provides a brief overview of goals of the
ADA and select state disability laws, with emphasis on the statutory
framework within each for an award of attorney’s fees and costs that
creates an incentive to engage in vexatious, serial litigation. Section II
examines judicial responses to abusive ADA litigation practices, and
sanctions that have been imposed to curb the abuse. Section III provides
recommendations for corrective actions to address vexatious litigants and
the lawyers who facilitate the misuse of the ADA, as well as steps that
14 Minh N. Vu & Susan Ryan, ADA Title III Lawsuits Surge by More than 63%, to Over
4400, In 2014, SEYFARTH SHAW (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.adatitleiii.com/2015/04/ada-titleiii-lawsuits-surge-by-more-than-63-to-over-4400-in-2014/.
15 Minh Vu et al., ADA Title III Lawsuit Numbers Hold Steady for First Half of 2015,
SEYFARTH SHAW (Nov. 6, 2015), http://www.adatitleiii.com/2015/11/ada-title-iii-lawsuit-num
bers-hold-steady-for-first-half-of-2015/.
16 Id.
17 Shipley & Maines, supra note 8.
18 Id. (“‘About 80 percent of the [businesses] don’t ever do the changes or do a minimal
amount of changes, and that defeats the whole purpose of the ADA,’ said Bob Cohen, the head
of Access for the Disabled, a not-for-profit in Coral Springs that has been a party in more than
375 such lawsuits.”).
19 Id. (“One Palm Beach restaurant owner confided to the Sun Sentinel that he agreed in
a settlement to pay more than $12,000 in plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, but didn’t have enough
cash after forking over those costs to fix all of the violations in his establishment. The owner
declined to be named. So far, he said, nobody’s come back to check.”).
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may be taken to promote equality of opportunity for individuals with
disabilities.
I.

ADA: INCREASING ACCESSIBILITY
DISABILITIES

TO

INDIVIDUALS

WITH

In promulgating the ADA in 1990, Congress noted that over 43 million Americans suffered from a disability and that this number was expected to increase as the population expands.20 Today, roughly one in
five Americans have a disability.21 Under Title III of the ADA, “[n]o
individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the
full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by
any person who owns, leases (or leases to) or operated a place of public
accommodation.”22 Title III prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by a (1) public accommodation,23 (2) commercial facility,24 or (3)
20

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 101 P.L. 336.
Nearly 1 in 5 People Have a Disability in the U.S., Census Bureau Reports, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (July 25, 2012), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/miscellaneous/cb12-134.html.
22 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2012).
23 See 28 C.F.R § 36.104 (2015) (“Place of public accommodation means a facility operated by a private entity whose operations affect commerce and fall within at least one of the
following categories (1) Place of lodging, except for an establishment located within a facility
that contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and that actually is occupied by the
proprietor of the establishment as the residence of the proprietor. For purposes of this part, a
facility is a ‘place of lodging’ if it is – (i) An inn, hotel, or motel; or (ii) A facility that – (A)
Provides guest rooms for sleeping for stays that primarily are short-term in nature (generally
30 days or less) where the occupant does not have the right to return to a specific room or unit
after the conclusion of his or her stay; and (B) Provides guest rooms under conditions and with
amenities similar to a hotel, motel, or inn, including the following – (1) On- or off-site management and reservations service; (2) Rooms available on a walk-up or call-in basis; (3) Availability of housekeeping or linen service; and (4) Acceptance of reservations for a guest room
type without guaranteeing a particular unit or room until check-in, and without a prior lease or
security deposit. (2) A restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink; (3) A
motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment; (4) An auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public gathering; (5)
A bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other sales or
rental establishment; (6) A laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel
service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer,
pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other
service establishment; (7) A terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation; (8) A museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection; (9) A
park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation; (10) A nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private school, or other place of education; (11) A day
care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption agency, or other social
service center establishment; and (12) A gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or
other place of exercise or recreation.”).
24 See id. (noting that commercial facilities means facilities: “(1) Whose operations will
affect commerce; (2) That are intended for nonresidential use by a private entity; and (3) That
are not – (i) Facilities that are covered or expressly exempted from coverage under the Fair
21
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private entity that offers examinations or courses related to applications,
licensing, certification, or credentialing for secondary or postsecondary
education, professional, or trade purposes.25
Public accommodations are required to make “reasonable modifications” to their policies, practices, and procedures unless such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.26 The ADA requires places of public accommodation and commercial facilities to be
designed, constructed, and altered in compliance with the accessibility
standards established under the Act.27 A public accommodation is required to remove architectural barriers in existing facilities, including
communication barriers that are structural in nature, where such removal
is readily achievable.28 If such removal is not readily achievable, the
public accommodation is required to provide goods and services through
“alternative methods,” if such methods are themselves readily achievable.29 Title III of the ADA ensures that the access needs of individuals
with disabilities are addressed, but the broad scope of its provisions
makes it easy to find violations, particularly minor violations, that subject businesses to costly litigation.
Congress granted authority to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
to investigate and prosecute administrative complaints alleging violations
of Title III of the ADA.30 However, unless complaints show a “pattern
and practice” of repeat violations, the DOJ generally declines to investigate alleged violations.31 Recognizing the inability of the U.S. government to adequately address the myriad of accessibility violations that
may emerge throughout the country, Congress also encouraged private
enforcement under Title III.32 While providing both a private right of
action and a public right of action for the Attorney General, Congress
Housing Act of 1968, as amended (42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631); (ii) Aircraft; or (iii) Railroad
locomotives, railroad freight cars, railroad cabooses, commuter or intercity passenger rail cars
(including coaches, dining cars, sleeping cars, lounge cars, and food service cars), any other
railroad cars described in section 242 of the Act or covered under title II of the Act, or railroad
rights-of-way”).
25 See id. (A private entity means a person or entity other than a public entity); see also
28 C.F.R. § 36.102 (2016).
26 28 C.F.R. § 36.302 (2015).
27 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (2012).
28 See 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(a) (2015).
29 28 C.F.R. § 36.305 (2015).
30 Id.
31 See Ruth Colker, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT 192 (New York University Press 2005) (finding that the Department of
Justice, an agency charged with national enforcement of the ADA, reached only 107 public
accommodations settlements in ten years–less than one settlement a month).
32 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies: The Case of
“Abusive” ADA Legislation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1, 8–10 (noting that there are only a “small
cadre of lawyers” enforcing the ADA).
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elected to limit available remedies.33 Only the Attorney General may
seek monetary damages on behalf of an aggrieved party.34 For a private
litigant, the only remedies available are injunctive relief and the recovery
of attorneys’ fees and costs.35 This public/private distinction demonstrates a clear Congressional intent to prohibit private plaintiffs from recovering monetary damages under the ADA.36 To incentivize private
attorneys to take Title III cases, Congress authorized courts, in their discretion, to award reasonable attorneys’ fees, including litigation expenses
and costs to the prevailing party.37 As currently interpreted by courts,
attorneys’ fees may be awarded to plaintiffs who obtain a judgment on
the merits or a court-ordered consent decree,38 a preliminary injunction,39 or a private settlement agreement.40
The ADA affords standing to any person who is being subjected to
discrimination on the basis of disability or who has reasonable grounds
for believing he or she is about to be subjected to discrimination prohibited under the Act to institute a private civil action for relief.41 To succeed under Title III of the ADA in a private lawsuit, a non-employee
plaintiff must show that he or she is disabled; the defendant is a private
entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation;
and the plaintiff was denied public accommodations by the defendant
because of the plaintiff’s disability.42 Plaintiffs typically employ private
attorneys to seek injunctive relief under the ADA to force entities to
make facilities readily accessible and usable by individuals with disabilities; and then tack on state law claims to recover damages.43 However,
currently there is no effective means to insure that these private actions
33

42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)–(b) (2012).
Id. § 12188(b)(2)(B).
35 Id. § 12188(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (2012).
36 Am. Bus. Ass’n v. Slater, 231 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
37 See 28 C.F.R. § 36.505 (2015) (“In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to the Act or this part, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation
expenses, and costs, and the United States shall be liable for the foregoing the same as a
private individual.”).
38 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & Human Res., 532
U.S. 598, 605 (2001).
39 Watson v. Cnty. of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1095–96 (9th Cir. 2002).
40 Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2002).
41 See 28 C.F.R. § 36.501(a) (2015).
42 Id.
43 See id. § 36.501(b) (“Injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make
such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities to the extent
required by the Act or this part. Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the provision of an auxiliary aid or service, modification of a policy, or provision of alternative methods, to the extent required by the Act or this part.”); see also infra notes 49–52,
55–56, and accompanying text.
34
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actually result in changes that provide increased access to individuals
with disabilities.
Title III of the ADA does not require a litigant to provide notice to
the alleged violator prior to filing suit in federal court.44 Lawyers filing
ADA Title III claims often fail to provide pre-suit notice to defendants
because doing so provides opportunity for alleged violators to take steps
to remedy the violation, render the case moot, and avoid having to pay
attorneys’ fees and costs.45 The attorney fee structure, and the relative
ease with which attorneys can extract payment through settlement agreements with entities found in violation of the ADA has led to increased
litigation under Title III of the ADA.
Between 2012 and 2014, the number of ADA Title III cases filed
increased dramatically in California (1886); Florida (1553); New York
(212); and Pennsylvania (135).46 One reason for the rise of cases in these
states is the opportunity provided under each state’s laws to obtain additional fees and costs. California has led the country in ADA Title III
litigation, primarily because of its plaintiff-friendly state disability laws
that, unlike the ADA, provide for monetary damages.47
California law incorporates ADA standards to strengthen state disability laws; and in some circumstances, provides greater protection for
individuals with disabilities than provided under the ADA.48 Under the
California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (UCRA), “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex,
race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, or medical condition are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges or services in all business establishments of every kind
whatsoever.”49 The Act creates a private right of action against anyone
who “denies, aids or incites a denial, or makes any discrimination or
distinction contrary to [the Act].”50 Section 51(f) of the Unruh Act provides that, “[a] violation of the right of any individual under the [ADA]
shall also constitute a violation of this section.”51 The Unruh Act permits
44

Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2000).
Bagenstos, supra note 32, at 14.
46 Vu & Ryan, supra note 14.
47 Vicky Nguyen et al., California Outpaces Other States in ADA Lawsuits, NBC BAY
AREA (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.nbcbayarea.com/investigations/California-Outpaces-OtherStates-in-ADA-Lawsuits-disability-act-246193931.html.
48 Id. at 673; see Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 208 P.3d 623 (Cal. 2009) (“The general
intent of the [Unruh Act] legislation was . . . to strengthen California law in areas where it is
weaker than the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 . . . and to retain California law when
it provides more protection for individuals with disabilities than the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.”).
49 CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b) (2016).
50 Id. § 52(a).
51 Id. § 51(f).
45
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a successful plaintiff to collect “actual damages, and any amount that
may be determined by a jury, or a court sitting without a jury, up to a
maximum of three times the amount of actual damage but in no case less
than $4,000,” as well as attorney’s fees.52 This is true even where the
violation is seemingly trivial.53 The Act has been interpreted to allow for
an award of attorney fees to either the plaintiff or the defendant.54
Under California’s Disabled Persons Act (DPA), “individuals with
disabilities shall be entitled to full and equal access, as other members of
the general public, to accommodations . . . places of public accommodation, amusement, or resort, and other places to which the general public
is invited . . .”55 Under the DPA, a successful plaintiff can collect damages in the amount of three times the amount of actual damages, with a
minimum award of $1,000 for each and every offense.56 Under California law, a violation of the ADA also constitutes a violation of both the
UCRA and the CDPA.57 However, a successful plaintiff may not collect
awards under both state statutes for the same case.58 Claimants are allowed to multiply the damage amounts by the number of violations at a
property.59
In California, overlapping and inconsistent state and federal laws,
coupled with limited continuing education for building inspectors and
architects, as well as inconsistent adjudications of disability laws have
made it particularly difficult for businesses to accurately assess compliance with disability-access standards.60 This reality has created opportunities for aggressive plaintiffs and attorneys to identify entities that have
violated the technical requirements of the disability laws and that are
unlikely to aggressively defend against claims. Many of the ADA Title
III lawsuits filed in California have targeted small businesses with minor
violations, such as not having a disability sign, which render the case
meritorious on technical grounds.61 As a result, these businesses are
forced to pay cash settlements to the litigants without ever having a
52

Id. § 52(a).
Frank W. Chen, Advising Clients Regarding ADA Accessibility Lawsuits in California,
LAW OFFICES OF FRANK W. CHEN (Feb. 2016), http://www.sgvba.org/articles/ADA.pdf.
54 See Jankey v. Lee, 290 P.3d 187, 196 (Cal. 2012).
55 CAL. CIV. CODE §54.1(a)(1) (2016).
56 Id. § 54.3(a).
57 Stevens v. Optimum Health Inst.–San Diego Eyeglasses, 810 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1097
(S.D. Cal. 2011).
58 Bruno W. Katz, Defending a Title III ADA Accessibility Claim, CAL. RESTAURANT
ASS’N, http://www.calrest.org/defending-a-title-iii-ada-accessibility-claim.html (last visited
August 2, 2016).
59 See id. at 1085.
60 Chen, supra note 53.
61 Ramona Giwargis, Another Valley Lawmaker Joins Fight Against Predatory ADA
Lawsuits, MERCED SUN-STAR (Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.mercedsunstar.com/news/local/
article6589254.html.
53
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meaningful opportunity to correct the violation.62 Anecdotal evidence
exists suggesting that some plaintiffs involved in these lawsuits never
even attempted to enter the establishments they later claimed in their
lawsuits violated their right to access.63 A large majority of the ADA
Title III cases have been brought on behalf of a small number of individual plaintiffs by a handful of attorneys. One report revealed that of 649
ADA lawsuits filed by two California attorneys working for the same
firm between 2009 and 2013, 518 cases were brought in the names of
just eight clients—an average of approximately sixty-five cases per client.64 One California lawyer who specializes in disability-access suits
said the average settlement for ADA lawsuits in California was $45,000
in 2013.65 This troubling pattern has led one California court to opine
that, “the means for enforcing the ADA (attorney’s fees) have become
more important and desirable than the end (accessibility for disabled individuals).”66 The California Legislature has responded to this problem
by introducing bills that would provide businesses with pre-suit demand
letters and set periods of time within which to cure the violation before
being liable, but in absence of these and other limitations on actions, the
problem persists.67
Like California, Florida law contains provisions allowing for compensatory damages, including but not limited to, damages for mental
anguish, loss of dignity, other intangible injuries, and punitive damages.68 As a result, Florida, and particularly South Florida, has become a
hotbed for ADA Title III access cases.69 One investigation revealed that
a majority of these claims end in settlements that provide payment to the
attorneys, but fail to correct the violations that supported the underlying
legal claim.70 Approximately two-thirds of the roughly 700 ADA disabled-access suits filed in Florida in 2013 were brought by a small num62

Id.
Thom Jensen, Americans with Disabilities Lawsuits Investigated, NEWS10 (Nov. 26,
2013), http://host-37.242.54.159.gannett.com/news/article/264475/2/Americans-with-Disabili
ties-Act-lawsuits-investigated (reporting that the plaintiffs involved in a lawsuit rarely went to
the business that they filed suit against, but merely drove by them, taking pictures and measurements looking for ADA violations); see also ADA Title III Drive-By Lawsuits, MIAMI
LOCAL 10 NEWS (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.adatitleiii.com/2016/02/miami-local-10-news-re
ports-on-ada-title-iii-drive-by-lawsuits/.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Brother v. Tiger Partner, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1375 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
67 Linda Mumma, Lawmakers Band Together to Fight Drive-By ADA Lawsuits, KCRA
NEWS (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.kcra.com/news/lawmakers-band-together-to-fight-drivebyada-lawsuits/31511266; Katz, supra note 58.
68 FLA. STAT. §760.11(5) (2016).
69 Shipley & Maines, supra note 8.
70 Id.
63
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ber of plaintiffs who were represented by only a few attorneys.71 Some
of these lawsuits show abuse of the legal system. For example, one Florida lawsuit targeted a wheelchair store, owned by a disabled couple.72 In
another, a Florida attorney filed suit against a pawn shop, liquor store,
and a swimming-pool supply shop on behalf of a twelve year-old girl,
alleging violations of the ADA.73 The lawsuit was filed even though the
young girl would not likely frequent any of these establishments considering her age, and the fact that her family did not have a pool.74 One
Florida attorney filed over 700 ADA lawsuits over a four-year period and
settled most of those cases for $3,000 to $5,000 per case in attorney’s
fees and agreements by the businesses to become ADA compliant.75
However, once the lawsuit was settled, the incentive to follow up to ensure compliance disappeared.
Title III of the ADA has been described as “massively under-enforced” due in large part to the limitations on remedies for violations.76
Access to attorney’s fees for the prevailing party encourages litigants to
address violations of the ADA and is necessary to ensure enforcement,
but it is subject to abuse. In some cases, however, the primary motivation
to bring a lawsuit shifts from a desire to eliminate a violation to a desire
to obtain plaintiff’s attorney fees, costs and expenses.77 The relative ease
with which attorneys can identify violations of the ADA creates a disincentive for those attorneys to quickly settle cases in return for guarantees
of corrective action. The availability of fees and costs to the prevailing
party also acts as a disincentive for businesses to defend lawsuits because
technical violations of the ADA are often easy to prove.78 Because an
unsuccessful defense renders the business owner potentially liable for
paying the bills for two sets of attorneys, businesses are often motivated
to settle rather than risk litigation.79 This, in turn, renders some businesses vulnerable to abusive, serial litigation.80 Because there is no effective mechanism to insure the violations of the Act have been cured as a
result of the litigation, the current format often leads to an odd result that
71

Id.
Walter Olson, The ADA Shakedown Racket, CITY JOURNAL (2004), http://www.cityjournal.org/html/ada-shakedown-racket-12494.html.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Casey L. Raymond, A Growing Threat to the ADA: An Empirical Study of Mass Filings, Popular Backlash, and Potential Solutions Under Title II and III, 18 TEX. J. ON C.L. &
C.R. 235, 254 (2013).
76 Bagenstos, supra note 32, at 6.
77 See Rodriguez v. Investco, L.L.C., 305 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (M.D. Fla. 2004); see
Shipley and Maines, supra note 8.
78 See Shipley and Maines, supra note 8.
79 Id.
80 Id.
72
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rewards an attorney for successfully “enforcing” the ADA even though
the underlying violation persists.81 The problem can be particularly acute
for small business owners forced to choose between paying attorneys’
fees and investing money to correct the violation to increase access for
disabled individuals.82 The current format creates a disincentive to litigate for the benefit of disabled individuals. Courts have started to push
back against abusive Title III litigation, but the impacts of restricting
litigants from bringing action under the ADA must be balanced against
the remedial goals of the ADA.
II. JUDICIAL RESPONSE

TO

VEXATIOUS ADA LITIGATION

Serial ADA access litigation is troubling and threatens to set back
advancements made in the societal perspective of individuals with disabilities and the enforcement of their rights under the ADA. Courts have
responded to the “cottage industry” that has developed around ADA Title
III access cases flooding the courts and have started to recognize that in
many cases the plaintiff’s real motivation for bringing the action is to
extract money from the defendant through settlement.83
In Rodriguez v. Investco, L.L.C., the plaintiff, a quadriplegic confined to a wheelchair, had previously filed over 200 ADA lawsuits and
was represented by the same attorney for most of those cases.84 The defendant was a Florida hotel, which consisted of two eighteen-floor towers.85 At the time of the case, Tower 1 was being renovated while Tower
2 was vacant and not involved in the dispute.86 Shortly after the acquisition of the hotel, the Defendant hired an architect to renovate the hotel,
and also hired an ADA consultant to assist with ADA compliance.87 The
plaintiff stayed at the facility in May of 2002, before Defendant actually
acquired the property.88 Plaintiff planned to stay two nights, but only
stayed one, claiming he was not able to enjoy the facility because of the
barriers.89 The plaintiff advised his attorney of the barriers in the facility,
81 Id. (“‘About 80 percent of the [businesses] don’t ever do the changes or do a minimal
amount of changes, and that defeats the whole purpose of the ADA,’ said Bob Cohen, the head
of Access for the Disabled, a not-for-profit in Coral Springs that has been a party in more than
375 such lawsuits.”).
82 Id. (“One Palm Beach restaurant owner confided to the Sun Sentinel that he agreed in
a settlement to pay more than $12,000 in plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, but didn’t have enough
cash after forking over those costs to fix all of the violations in his establishment. The owner
declined to be named. So far, he said, nobody has come back to check.”).
83 See Rodriguez v. Investco, L.L.C., 305 F. Supp. 2d. 1278, 1280–81 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
84 Id. at 1279.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1280.
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the attorney inspected the facility, and the attorney told the plaintiff the
facility was not ADA compliant.90 The attorney then filed a suit only
four days later.91 Plaintiff stated that he made plans to return to the facility, but he had made the reservations just two days prior to trial.92 He
could not explain why he wanted to return and stay at the facility rather
than stay at a nearby hotel that was fully compliant.93 The defendant
introduced evidence showing that a majority of the hotel was ADA compliant, and that the remainder would become ADA compliant shortly.94
The defendant’s expert opined that all the deficiencies were capable of
correction and that the renovation plans would achieve the result of being
compliant with the ADA.95 The court acknowledged that in promulgating
the ADA, Congress did not create an administrative process for entities
to follow to show compliance under the ADA, and that Congress left it to
aggrieved individuals to file a private right of action to address violations.96 The court noted that although remedies under the ADA are limited to injunctive relief, Congress authorized an award of attorney’s fees
to the prevailing party to encourage individuals to seek compliance.97
The court added that despite the increased number of ADA lawsuits filed
in the court, there were relatively few plaintiffs willing to assume the
role of “private attorneys general.”98 However, the court recognized the
troubling reality that most of the lawsuits were filed by the same attorneys representing the same clients, and questioned the real motives behind the lawsuits.99 The court admonished the plaintiff’s attorney for
filing the lawsuit less than a week after learning of the ADA deficiencies,
for his failure to encourage voluntary compliance, or to encourage remedial measures.100 In the court’s view, a plaintiff motivated by a desire to
improve access for disabled individuals would logically seek to obtain
the violator’s conciliation and voluntary compliance before bringing a
legal action against the entity under Title III of the ADA.101 However,
90

Id.
Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1281.
97 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12205, which provides, “In any action . . . commenced pursuant
to this chapter, the court . . . , in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable
attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs . . . ”).
98 Id.
99 Id. at 1281.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 1281–82 (“Why would an individual like Plaintiff be in such a rush to file suit
when only injunctive relief is available? Wouldn’t conciliation and voluntary compliance be a
more rational solution? Of course it would, but pre-suit settlements do not vest plaintiffs’
counsel with an entitlement to attorney’s fees.”).
91
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the court noted that the structure of the ADA itself creates a disincentive
for plaintiffs to seek compliance because “pre-suit settlements do not
vest plaintiff’s counsel with an entitlement to attorney’s fees.”102 The
court opined that “[t]he current ADA lawsuit binge is, therefore, essentially driven by economics – that is, the economics of attorneys’ fees.”103
After holding that the plaintiff in Rodriguez failed to establish any basis
for relief under the ADA, the court opined that the plaintiff was “merely
a professional pawn in an ongoing scheme to bilk attorney’s fees from
the Defendant.”104
In Jones v. Eagle-North Hills Shopping Centre, L.P.,105 the plaintiff
alleged violations of the ADA which included: “lack of proper signage at
the accessible parking spaces; cross slopes too steep in various accessible
parking spaces; improper access aisles at various accessible parking
spaces; entry doors at various locations with panel-type pull handles;
and, . . . a public telephone lacking proper floor clearance (trash in the
way).”106 Prior to filing suit, the only notice plaintiff provided of the
violations was a verbal statement to a construction worker that the property had barriers to access.107 Shortly thereafter, the parties filed a joint
stipulation of voluntary dismissal without prejudice dismissing the
claims.108 The plaintiffs then requested $14,235.58 in attorney’s fees.109
The defendant argued that the fees were excessive, unreasonable, and
that the fees requested were outside the scope allowable under federal
law.110 The court recognized that plaintiff’s attorney was entitled to an
award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, and employed the Lodestar Method to identify an appropriate award.111 More importantly, the
court reduced the fee based on the plaintiff’s failure to provide advanced
102 Id. (citing Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001)).
103 Id. at 1282.
104 Id. at 1285.
105 478 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (E.D. Okla. 2007).
106 Id. at 1324.
107 Id. at 1331.
108 Id. at 1325.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 1325–26; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2012) (“In any action or administrative
proceeding commenced pursuant to this chapter, the court or agency, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including
litigation expenses, and costs, and the United States shall be liable for the foregoing the same
as a private individual.”); Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1992) (holding that a plaintiff becomes a “prevailing party” if “actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the
legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that
directly benefits the plaintiff”); Case v. United Sch. Dist. No. 233, 157 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th
Cir. 1998) (using “Lodestar Method” to identify an appropriate award by which a reasonable
hourly rate is multiplied by the reasonable number of hours worked on the case).
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notice of the violation to the defendant and opportunity to cure.112 The
court acknowledged that there is no notice requirement under the ADA,
and that previous efforts by Congress to amend the ADA to require presuit notice had failed, but found the complete lack of effort by the plaintiff to address the violation outside of litigation to be problematic.113 It
noted that in considering an award of attorney fees, a district court retains the inherent power to consider whether litigation is frivolous, and
“whether the plaintiff’s failure to ask for or to accept voluntary compliance prior to suit indicates that the plaintiff has acted in bad faith, has
been unduly litigious, or has caused unnecessary trouble and expense.”114 Recognizing that generally the failure of a plaintiff to provide
pre-suit notice does not compel the court to reduce the fee award, the
court noted that where there is evidence showing the plaintiff filed or
maintained the suit unnecessarily, the court may factor that into its consideration when determining the amount of fees that should be
awarded.115 The court then reduced the award of attorney’s fees by ten
percent based on the plaintiff’s failure to take adequate steps to notify the
defendant of the ADA violation before filing the lawsuit.116 Collectively,
these decisions reduced the award from the requested $14,235.58 to
$6,616.89.117 While such a reduction works fairness into the process, this
may be lost when the same plaintiff engages in serial litigation in multiple courts before different judges.
In Molski v. Mandarin Touch Restaurant (Molski I), a federal district court granted a motion to declare the plaintiff a vexatious litigant
and to impose pre-filing restrictions on the plaintiff and his attorney.118
The plaintiff, a physically disabled individual who used a wheelchair,
alleged that he had dinner at the defendant’s establishment and attempted
to use the restroom, but found that there was not enough clear space in
the stall to permit him to access the toilet from his wheelchair.119 He
alleged that while he attempted to leave the restroom, his hand became
caught in the exterior door, causing trauma to his hand.120 Molski asked
for injunctive relief to remedy the accessibility issues and damages not
less than $4,000 per day, for each day after his visit until such time as the
restaurant was made fully accessible.121 Evidence revealed that Molski
112

Jones, 478 F. Supp. 2d. at 1331–33.
Id. at 1331.
114 Id. at. 1332 (citing Ass’n of Disabled Ams. v. Neptune Designs, Inc., 469 F.3d 1357,
1360 (11th Cir. 2006)).
115 Id.
116 Id. at 1332–33.
117 Id.
118 Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 347 F. Supp. 2d 860, 868 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
119 Id. at 862.
120 Id.
121 Id.
113
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had previously filed hundreds of ADA access lawsuits in federal courts
throughout the state of California.122 Those cases were nearly identical in
terms of the facts alleged, the claims presented, and the damages
requested.123
After discussing how Congress clearly intended to prevent plaintiffs
from recovering damages in private Title III actions, the court provided
its own perspective on the rationale behind such damage award requests.124 The court opined that some attorneys and enterprising plaintiffs had “found a way to circumvent the will of Congress [to allow only
injunctive relief] by seeking money damages while retaining federal jurisdiction.”125 The court explained that plaintiffs were able to accomplish
this in California “[b]ecause a violation of the ADA also constitutes a
violation of California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f),
and the California Disabled Persons Act (“CDPA”), Cal. Civ. Code
§ 54(c).”126 Therefore, “[p]laintiffs can sue in federal court for injunctive
relief under the ADA, and tack on state law claims for money damages
under the Unruh Act and CDPA.”127 The court asserted that the current
framework encouraged plaintiffs to engage in “shotgun litigation [that]
undermines both the spirit and purpose of the ADA.”128
Although Molski’s complaint appeared credible standing alone, the
court noted that its validity was undermined when viewed alongside
Molski’s other complaints.129 Based on Molski’s extensive litigation history, the court considered whether it should invoke its inherent power to
levy sanctions in response to abusive litigation practices.130 The court
used five factors to determine whether the litigation was vexatious: (1)
the litigant’s history of litigation, and in particular whether it entailed
vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the litigant’s motive in
pursuing the litigation, e.g., does the litigant have an objective good faith
expectation of prevailing; (3) whether the litigant is represented by counsel; (4) whether the litigant has caused needless expense to other parties
or has posed an unnecessary burden on the courts and their personnel;
and (5) whether other sanctions would be adequate to protect the courts
and other parties.131
122 Id. at 861 n.2. The evidence showed Mr. Molski filed between 334 and 400 lawsuits in
the federal courts since 1998. Id.
123 Id. at 861.
124 Id. at 862–63.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 863 (citing Brother v. Tiger Partner, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1375 (M.D.
Fla. 2004)).
129 Id. at 864.
130 Id. at 863.
131 Id. at 864 (citing Safir v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 23 (2d Cir. 1986)).
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Considering the first factor, the court found that Molski had filed
numerous other claims alleging nearly identical injuries, on the exact
same day, and also filed “boilerplate complaints.”132 Based on the facts,
the court found that Molski had a history of vexatious litigation and an
intent to harass.133 The court noted that even if the businesses sued by
Molski had violated the ADA, these facts were outweighed by the fact
Molski acted in bad faith and for the improper purpose of extorting a
settlement.134 In addressing the second factor, Molski claimed that he
filed his lawsuits to “obtain injunctive relief, and that the funds recovered
were largely used to offset his legal expenses.”135 The court was not
persuaded by Molski’s purported benevolent intent to seek only injunctive relief.136 The court opined:
If Molski’s motivation was genuinely to obtain injunctive relief and recover his legal costs, he could sue entirely under the ADA. But he does not do that. Instead,
Molski almost always raises additional state law claims
under the CDPA, California Health & Safety Code, the
Unruh Civil Rights Act, and California Bus. & Prof.
Code § 17200, which allow for the recovery of money
damages.137
The fact that Molski was represented by counsel in every lawsuit
weighed against him as to the third factor.138 The court noted that, as to
the fourth factor, Molski’s actions showed that he filed a countless number of vexatious claims, unnecessarily burdening the courts.139
Based on the fact that each individual claim Molski had filed was
meritorious, yet vexatious when viewed in the aggregate, the court subjected Molski to a pre-filing notice requirement that required him to file a
motion for leave to file each subsequent ADA Title III complaint.140 The
court added that the restriction on filing acts to shield the Court and defendants from vexatious litigation, and protects the “purpose and spirit of
the ADA.”141 The court believed that the restriction was appropriate because it did not “limit the right of a legitimately aggrieved disabled individual to seek legal relief under the ADA.”142 Rather it was narrowly
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142

Id.
Id.
Id. at 865.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 866.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 866–67.
Id. at 868.
Id.
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tailored to prevent abuse of that law by “professional plaintiffs” and lawyers motivated by financial gain.”143
The court examined the actions of Molski’s attorney in Molski v.
Mandarin Touch Restaurant (Molski II), and required counsel to explain
why he and his law firm should not also be required to seek leave of
court before filing future complaints alleging violations of the ADA.144
The court examined the firm’s filing history and discovered that The
Frankovich Group had filed at least 223 ADA lawsuits.145 The 223 complaints were nearly identical in form and substance.146 Of those, 156
(70%) were filed on behalf of Molski.147 The evidence showed a common pattern that the court found troubling.148 After filing each ADA
lawsuit, the Frankovich Group sent a copy of the complaint directly to
each defendant, along with a letter, which counseled the unrepresented
defendant against hiring his own lawyer.149 The letter claimed that “the
‘vast majority’ of defense attorneys simply ‘embark on a billing expedition’ when hired, rather than looking out for their client’s best interest.150
‘Simply put,’ the letter continues, ‘defense attorneys want to sufficiently
“bill it” before they get realistic about the settlement.’”151 Accordingly,
the letter stated, the money required to retain a defense attorney “could
be better spent on the remedial work and settlement of the action.”152
The letter further advised the defendants that their insurance policy might
cover the ADA claim, and went on to describe, in considerable detail,
what provisions of a general liability policy might provide coverage, including separate discussions of bodily injury, advertising, and wrongful
eviction coverage.153 The Frankovich Group even offered to represent
the defendants in a suit against their insurer, should the insurer refuse to
provide coverage.154 Finally, the letter advised the defendants that they
did not “have any bona fide defense” to the lawsuit, and recommended
that they quickly settle the matter, rather than “waste [their] money on
needless litigation.”155 The court was notably appalled by the actions
taken by the Frankovich Group.156 The court reminded the parties that
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

Id. at 867 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2012)).
Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 359 F. Supp. 2d 924, 925 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
Id. at 926.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 926–28.
Id. at 928.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 934.
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“[t]he District Court has the inherent power to levy sanctions in response
to abusive litigation practices.”157 This power extends to protect the administration of justice from vexatious litigation.158 The court found that
the Frankovich Group violated Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.3,
which states, “[t]he lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel.”159 According to
the court, the Frankovich Group violated the rule when: (1) it advised an
unrepresented party against obtaining counsel, when it may only advise
the opposite; (2) it provided a considerable amount of legal advice on
pursuing a claim against the defendant’s insurance company; and (3) it
advised the unrepresented party that it does not “have any bona fide defense” to the lawsuit and recommended that it quickly settle the matter,
rather than “waste [its] money on needless litigation.”160 The court found
these actions to be egregious because they appeared to be aimed at coercing a quick and uninformed decision to settle.161 The court concluded
that the Frankovich Group engaged in a pattern of unethical behavior
designed ultimately to extort money from businesses and their insurers,
and requested that the state bar investigate the matter further and consider suspension or disbarment of the lawyers constituting the
Frankovich Group.162 While that matter was pending, the court entered a
pre-filing order that required “[t]he Frankovich Group . . . to seek leave
of court before filing a complaint alleging violations of the Americans
with Disabilities Act.”163 Unfortunately, the ethical violations raised in
Molski are not restricted to that case.164
These abuses of the ADA may foreshadow a larger problem as
courts utilize broader interpretations of the term “public accommodation”
that will subject more entities to liability under federal and state disability laws. In 2016, a California court became the first in the nation to hold
that a retailer’s online website violated the ADA because it was inaccessible to individuals with vision-related disabilities.165 That court held that
the plaintiff, an individual with a visual impairment, showed a sufficient
157

Id. at 928 (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765–66 (1980)).
Id. at 929 (citing In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1262 (2d Cir. 1984)).
159 Id.
160 Id. at 929–30.
161 Id. at 930.
162 Id. at 934.
163 Id.
164 See, e.g., Yates v. Belli Deli, No. C 07-01405 WHA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61431, at
*16–17 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2007). Interestingly, the Frankovich Law Group also represented
the plaintiff in Yates.
165 See Davis v. BMI/BNB Travelware Co., No. CIVDS1504682, 2016 WL 2935496, at
*1 (Cal. Apr. 15, 2016) (granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment); Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative,
Summary Adjudication at 1, Davis v. BMI/BNB Travelware Co., No. CIVDS1504682 (Cal.
Apr. 15, 2016).
158
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connection between the defendant’s physical retail store and its website
for the ADA to apply, and showed that he had been denied the “full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, privileges, and accommodations
offered by defendant because of his disability.”166 The court awarded the
plaintiff damages of $4,000 under California’s Unruh Act.167 The court
refused to find that repeated attempts to access the website constituted
additional violations under the Act, but it did issue an injunction requiring the retailer to take sufficient steps to either make its website accessible and useable to the visually impaired or terminate its website.168 This
ruling is particularly interesting given the fact that courts have split on
whether web-only based business are public accommodations under Title
III of the ADA.169
In Cullen v. Netflix, Inc., a deaf consumer filed suit against Netflix,
Inc., a provider of on-demand video streaming programming over the
Internet and disc rental by mail services, alleging violations of California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act and Disabled Persons Act (DPA) for failing
to provide full and equal access to its services.170 The court found that
Netflix’s web site was not a public accommodation.171 In National Federation of the Blind v. Scribd Inc., the national association of blind persons and one of its members alleged Scribd Inc., violated the ADA
because its web-only business was inaccessible to the blind.172 The court
found that the defendant’s digital library website and mobile applications
were places of public accommodation under Title III of the ADA.173 The
uncertainty surrounding website accessibility and liability under Title III
has been exacerbated by the DOJ’s reluctance to issue clear public accommodations regulations for websites.174 In view of the uncertainty,
courts have shown reluctance to dismiss website accessibility cases early,
166 See Davis, 2016 WL 2935496, at *1; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication, supra
note 165, at 1–2, 5.
167 See Davis, 2016 WL 2935496, at *1 (granting monetary damages); Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative,
Summary Adjudication, supra note 165, at 2, 18 (asserting that the plaintiff was entitled to
monetary damages under the Unruh Act).
168 The fact that the Unruh Act grants $4000 in damages for each instance of discrimination, coupled with the fact that the court only awarded $4000 in damages to the plaintiff,
indicates that the court only found a single instance of discrimination. See Davis, 2016 WL
2935496, at *1; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication, supra note 165, at 18; see also Cullen
v. Netflix, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
169 See Cullen, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1023.
170 Id. at 1021.
171 Id. at 1024.
172 Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Scribd, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 3d 565, 566–67 (D. Vt. 2015).
173 See id. at 576.
174 See Minh N. Vu & Kristina Launey, Justice Department Delays Web Accessibility
Regulations for at Least Three More Years, Leaving Businesses in Turmoil, SEYFARTH SHAW
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which could cause businesses to incur significant defense costs. Not surprisingly, litigation related to allegedly inaccessible websites has surged
in the first part of 2016.175 Given the number of web-based businesses,
and the fact that individuals could identify a Title III violation with a
click of the computer mouse without leaving the comfort of their own
homes, the potential for increased litigation in this area appears very
high.176
In a currently pending case, the National Federation of the Blind of
California (“NFBC”) and several individual blind members with guide
dogs, filed a lawsuit against Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”) alleging
that Uber drivers discriminated against blind individuals by refusing to
transport blind riders and their service animals.177 Uber filed a motion to
dismiss, asserting that it was not a public accommodation subject to Title
III.178 The court denied the motion, ordered Uber to answer the complaint, and held that additional facts were needed to determine whether
Uber is subject to the ADA as a public accommodation.179
As the courts wrestle with the scope of Title III and attempt to clarify which entities are public accommodations subject to the ADA, some
plaintiffs and attorneys will likely continue to exploit the uncertainty to
extort quick settlements from businesses to obtain attorneys’ fees that do
little to improve conditions for individuals with disabilities. More is
needed to balance the rights of aggrieved individuals with the need to
protect the courts and members of the public from abusive litigation
practices that do little to advance the goals of the ADA.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite the significant role attorneys have played in developing
laws that benefit society, the public perception of attorneys has always
suffered from the acts of a limited number of bad actors that cast the
profession in a bad light.180 In 2013, Americans ranked lawyers last
(Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.adatitleiii.com/2015/11/justice-department-delays-web-accessibil
ity-regulations-for-at-least-three-more-years-leaving-businesses-in-turmoil/.
175 Minh Vu, Nine U.S. Senators Urge Obama Administration to Issue Title III Website
Regulations ASAP, SEYFARTH SHAW (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.adatitleiii.com/2016/01/nineu-s-senators-urge-obama-administration-to-issue-title-iii-website-regulations-asap/.
176 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, there were 102,728 e-commerce retailers in the
United States in 2013. Mikal E. Belicove, How Many U.S.-Based Retail Stores are on the
Internet?, FORBES (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikalbelicove/2013/09/18/
how-many-u-s-based-online-retail-stores-are-on-the-internet/#41dc3cd143da.
177 Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Uber Tech., Inc., 103 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1076 (C.D. Cal
2015) (denying motion to dismiss).
178 Id.
179 Id. at 1083–84.
180 Leonard E. Gross, The Public Hates Lawyers: Why Should We Care?, 29 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1405, 1408 (1999) (discussing the long history of public perception issues suffered by
members of the legal community).
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among ten other groups of professionals with regard to their contribution
to society.181 Today, there are websites available that warn society of the
“10 ways lawyers rip off clients,” which exacerbate the negative stereotypes of the profession.182 Much of the negative public opinion of attorneys is based on fundamental misunderstandings of the role of lawyers in
the adversary system, misguided media portrayals, or limited knowledge
of the positive aspects of the legal profession.183 However, some of the
negative perception is justified based on improper, self-serving actions
taken by a small number of unscrupulous attorneys to the detriment of
the consuming public.184 Allowing vexatious ADA access litigation to
continue will only serve to increase the public’s negative perception of
lawyers.
Through the majority of this country’s history, individuals with disabilities were ostracized from mainstream society and remained largely
invisible under the laws of the nation.185 After nearly two hundred years,
attorneys, together with other advocates, succeeded in crafting a comprehensive civil rights law that guaranteed equality of access for all individuals with disabilities.186 As a result of the ADA, the invisible became
visible, and society was forced to take note of the problems with unequal
accessibility.187 Over the last several decades since passage of the ADA,
society has acquiesced in the advancement of disability rights through
litigation aimed at forcing compliance with the ADA. Fee-driven lawsuits that do not serve to ensure compliance with the ADA will add to the
declining public perception of lawyers, and threaten to undermine the
significant advancements made through the disability rights movements.
The legal profession, including the courts, must address these concerns
and hold attorneys more accountable for their harmful actions. The
181 Debra Cassens Weiss, How Much Do People Think Lawyers Contribute to Society?
Less than 9 Other Professions, Survey Says, ABA J. (Jul. 22, 2013, 12:53 PM), http://www.aba
journal.com/news/article/how_much_do_lawyers_contribute_to_society_less_than_nine_
other_professions_/; see also Public Esteem for Military Still High, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jul.
11, 2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/07/11/public-esteem-for-military-still-high/.
182 10 Ways Lawyers Rip Off Clients, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jul. 10, 2013, 11:56 AM), http://
www.businessinsider.com/10-ways-lawyers-rip-off-clients-2013-7.
183 See Wm. T. Robinson III, Lawyers Do Well by Doing Good, ABA J. (Oct. 1, 2011,
9:40 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/mag_article/lawyers_do_well_by_doing_good/
(describing the positive aspects of pro bono work); Randall Ryder, What Have You Done to
Improve Lawyers Public Image?, LAWYERIST.COM (Jul.1, 2011), https://lawyerist.com/29458/
improve-lawyers-public-image/ (describing ways in which lawyers can work to change negative public opinion); see also Gross, supra note 180, at 1421–22.
184 Gross, supra note 180, at 1422.
185 Wendy Taormina-Weiss, The Cost of Marginalizing People with Disabilities, DISABLED WORLD (Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.disabled-world.com/editorials/marginalizing.php.
186 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012) (describing the purpose of the ADA, which
seeks to end discrimination against individuals with disabilities).
187 See Arlene Mayerson, The History of the Americans with Disabilities Act, DISABILITY
RTS. EDUC. & DEF. FUND (1992), http://dredf.org/news/publications/the-history-of-the-ada/.
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Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide some guidance for courts
and the Bar, but other steps must be taken to amend the ADA to limit its
misuse in cases that fail to advance the goals of the Act.
A.

Impose Pre-Filing Restrictions for Abusive Litigation

The increase in vexatious ADA Title III litigation is problematic for
individuals with disabilities and harms the public’s perception of the legal community. Although the ADA encourages use of dispute resolution,
including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation,
and arbitration, to resolve disputes arising under the Act,188 today some
attorneys motivated by personal gain bypass this approach in favor of
direct litigation to obtain attorneys’ fees and costs. Because the larger
community has allowed the legal profession the right of self-regulation,189 the legal community should take action to address these abusive
litigation practices that often do little to advance the law.
The preamble to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) provides, “The legal profession’s relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-government.190
The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or selfinterested concerns of the bar.”191 The Model Rules add that “[a] lawyer
should strive to . . . improve the law and the legal profession and to
exemplify the legal profession’s ideals of public service.”192 Subsection
5 of the Preamble states: “[5] A lawyer’s conduct should conform to the
requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the
lawyer’s business and personal affairs. A lawyer should use the law’s
procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate
others.”193
These rules bind the lawyers who bring cases as well as members of
the judiciary charged with evaluating the cases and determining whether
attorneys’ fees are warranted. Lawyers who engage in the serial filing of
ADA Title III access cases may not violate the letter of these rules where
each individual case standing alone has merit. However, where the same
attorney routinely brings nearly identical claims against parties under the
ADA and adds state law claims seeking damages, fees and costs, courts
should be required to evaluate the attorney’s litigation history more
188 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T JUST., ADA Mediation Program: Questions and Answers,
ADA.GOV (Jan. 3, 2014), http://www.ada.gov/mediation_docs/mediation-q-a.htm.
189 See William T. Gallagher, Ideologies of Professionalism and the Politics of Self-Regulation in the California State Bar, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 458, 488 (1995).
190 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble & Scope (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
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closely to determine whether the lawyer is abusing the process. The
Model Rules support such judicial intervention as a means of regulating
attorney behavior that may be prejudicial to the administration of justice.
However, courts must balance this right to regulate members of the legal
community with an individual’s fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts.194
The All Writs Act authorizes the United States federal courts to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”195 This Act has
been interpreted to provide federal courts with the inherent power to regulate activities of abusive litigants through imposition of carefully tailored pre-filing restrictions when appropriate.196 More courts should
consider the appropriateness of this action when reviewing the records of
those individuals who repeatedly file ADA Title III access cases. Courts
have found that limited pre-filing restrictions may be appropriate where:
(1) the court provides the litigant with notice and an opportunity to oppose the pre-filing order before it is entered; (2) the court compiles an
adequate record for appellate review, including “a listing of all the cases
and motions that led the district court to conclude that a vexatious litigant
order was needed”; (3) the court makes substantive findings of frivolousness or harassment; and (4) the court narrowly tailors the pre-filing “to
closely fit the specific vice encountered.”197 The last two factors are useful to identify a vexatious litigant and steps needed to stop abusive
practices.
Federal courts utilize a five-step process to identify vexatious litigants and to determine whether to impose a pre-filing order.198 These
include: (1) the litigant’s history of litigation and in particular whether it
entailed vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the litigant’s
motive in pursuing the litigation, e.g., does the litigant have an objective
good faith expectation of prevailing?; (3) whether the litigant is represented by counsel; (4) whether the litigant has caused needless expense
to other parties or has posed an unnecessary burden on the courts and
their personnel; and (5) whether other sanctions would be adequate to
protect the courts and other parties.199 The last factor is important be194 See Delew v. Wagner, 143 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998); Moy v. United States, 906
F.2d 467, 470 (9th Cir. 1990).
195 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012).
196 See De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that Federal
courts can “regulate the activities of abusive litigants by imposing carefully tailored restrictions under the appropriate circumstances”) (citing Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351, 352 (10th
Cir. 1989)).
197 Id. at 1147–48.
198 Safir v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1986).
199 Id.
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cause it suggests that steps short of pre-filing restrictions should be taken
if possible. For the ADA Title III access cases, this raises a complex
issue because often the underlying individual claims are meritorious. It is
relatively easy to identify a violation of the ADA.200 Thus, courts may be
particularly reluctant to restrict access where a litigant can argue that the
underlying claims are meritorious. Instead, courts should look beyond
the merits of the case to determine the true purpose of the litigation.
Courts have recognized that individually, the fact that a federal plaintiff
has filed a large number of complaints or that the complaints are factually similar does not warrant designating a litigant as “vexatious” and
imposing pre-filing orders restricting access to the court.201 However,
evidence of an attorney’s willful abuse of judicial process, bad faith conduct during litigation, or filing of frivolous papers justify imposing limited sanctions against an attorney that do not have the effect of making it
impossible for the attorney to pursue meritorious ADA litigation in district court.202
B. Impose a Notice Requirement
Title III of the ADA was patterned after Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). Title III provides that “[t]he remedies and
procedures set forth in section 2000a-3(a) of [Title VII] are the remedies
and procedures this subchapter provides to any person who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability . . . . ”203 Title VII
includes the requirement that a plaintiff refer a complaint to a state
agency for resolution and wait thirty days before filing suit in federal
court where the state has enacted laws prohibiting the discriminatory
conduct.204 However, courts have held that Title III of the ADA does not
require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies or to provide notice
prior to bringing a claim for injunctive relief against a private entity.205
Thus, unlike other laws, Title III of the ADA does not require a litigant
to provide notice to the alleged violator prior to filing suit in federal
court.206 This is advantageous to litigants because it provides little opportunity for alleged violators to take steps to remedy the violation and
200 See Tiffiny Carlson, 10 Infuriating and All Too Common ADA Violations that Need to
Stop. Now., HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 8, 2013, 11:48 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/10/08/ada-violations_n_4064270.html.
201 See Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007).
202 See generally Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 8.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (stating
that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct).
203 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (2012).
204 See id. § 2000a-3(c).
205 See Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., 964 F. Supp. 597, 605 (D. P.R. 1997), rev’d on other
grounds by Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., 133 F.3d 141 (1st Cir. 1998).
206 See id.; see also Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2000).
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render the case moot. Congress has considered and rejected attempts to
impose a notification requirement to avoid this problem, in part, because
such a requirement may create a disincentive for businesses to take steps
to comply with the ADA until they receive notice.207 In 2000, Bill
H.R.3590, the ADA Notification Act, was introduced into the House of
Representatives.208 The Bill sought to amend Title III of the ADA by
denying jurisdiction to a court in a civil action for remedies for disability
discrimination in public accommodations unless the plaintiff first provided notice of the alleged violation and provided the defendant with a
ninety-day period to take corrective action.209 The Bill allowed for the
imposition of an appropriate sanction upon attorneys who filed a claim
without providing proper notice, and prohibited an award of attorneys’
fees (including litigation expenses) or costs if the sanctioned attorney
subsequently brought the action.210
When H.R.3590 was brought to the floor for debate, Chairman
Charles T. Canady acknowledged that “the progress brought about by the
ADA is being threatened by a growing number of lawyers who are generating large sums in legal fees for pointing out often simple fixes that
would bring properties into compliance with the ADA.”211 He opined
that the “litigation abuse” was due to the absence of a notice proviso in
the ADA.212 He added,
This gap in the law now poses a danger that attorneys
will continue to exploit it and needlessly foment ill will
between the disabled community and small property
owners who would in good faith bring properties into
compliance with the ADA if only they were alerted to
the law’s requirements.213
The Bill’s sponsor, Congressman Foley asserted, “the ADA is being used
by some attorneys to shake down thousands of businesses from Florida
to California. And they’re doing so at the expense of people with disabilities.”214 In advocating for the addition of a notice requirement, Foley
argued,
207 See generally Adam A. Milani, Go Ahead. Make My 90 Days: Should Plaintiffs Be
Required to Provide Notice to Defendants Before Filing Suit Under Title III Of The Americans
with Disabilities Act? 2001 WIS. L. REV. 107, 131–32 (2001) (discussing the risks of including
and removing the notice requirement from Title III).
208 H.R. 3590, 106th Cong. (2d Sess. 2000).
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 The ADA Notification Act: Hearing on H.R. 3590 Before Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 2000 (2000) (statement of Chairman
Charles T. Canady).
212 Id. at 9.
213 Id.
214 Hearing on H.R. 3590 at 15 (statement of Rep. Mark Foley).
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[M]ost of the businesses that had been sued had no idea
they were violating the ADA. And most didn’t need a
lawsuit to force them to make simple corrections, like
adding parking signs or repainting old ones. A simple
notice telling them they were out of compliance and vulnerable to a lawsuit would have probably done the
trick.215
Disability rights advocates argued against imposing a notice requirement on Title III plaintiffs. Christine Griffin, then Executive Director of the Disability Law Center, asserted that imposing a notice
requirement would harm individuals with disabilities without making any
of the public accommodations comply with the law.216 She added that
amending the ADA to add a notification requirement would “remove the
primary incentive for businesses to take the initiative to ensure access to
their goods and services . . . [because] the primary economic motivation
to voluntarily comply with the law is the prospect of paying attorneys’
fees to plaintiff’s counsel if a Title III violation is proven.”217 Another
disability lawyer opined that adoption of a notice requirement would create a disincentive for people to “consider complying with the law until
(and unless) they get a letter.”218 The net result, he said, would be “less
voluntary compliance” with the ADA’s accessibility requirements.219
However, these justifications may not be as strong in 2016 as they were
in 2000. States have supplemented the ADA through their own state disability laws to allow for damages, which provide additional incentives for
plaintiffs and attorneys to bring suit today and for businesses to comply
with the law.220
The disability lawyer then added that the ADA had been in existence for a decade, and “[a]nyone who truly cares about accessibility has
had ample opportunity to find out what the law requires and to conform
their conduct to the law.”221 The Bill was never enacted into law. Similar
bills have been introduced in subsequent years and have met the same
fate.222
215

Id. at 21.
Hearing on H.R. 3590 at 61–62 (statement of Christine Griffin).
217 Id. at 62.
218 Hearing on H.R. 3590 at 94 (statement of Andrew D. Levy).
219 Id.
220 See Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Disability Rights and Public Accommodations: State-byState, 2000 SE. ADA CTR. 1, 10, 16, 24, http://adasoutheast.org/publications/ada/public_accommodations_disability_rights_state-by-state_Final.pdf.
221 Hearing on H.R. 3590 at 97.
222 H.R. 3479, 110th Cong. (1st. Sess. 2007); H.R. 2397, 111th Cong. (1st. Sess. 2009);
H.R. 881, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); H.R. 777, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
216
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The broad coverage provided under the ADA resulted from a “fragile compromise” reached that limited the remedies under ADA Title III
to injunctive relief.223 Congress agreed to increase the scope of coverage
in return for eliminating damage awards for private actions.224 The compromise was made, in part, based on concerns raised by Attorney General Thornburgh that,
(1) businesses could not make accurate predictions of the
types of modifications required because the ‘readily
achievable’ compliance standard was not well defined . . . (2) the remedies for violations of ADA Title III
should parallel the pre-existing remedies already present
under CRA Title II, rather than the broader remedies existing in the FHA, and (3) the scope of businesses covered by ADA Title III should be narrowed so as not to
impose undue hardship on small businesses.225
In the years immediately following the passage of the ADA, the limited
scope of relief available under Title III served as a disincentive to litigate
such claims. Although it was then recognized that “plaintiffs have a
somewhat easier time prevailing under ADA Title III than ADA Title I,”
plaintiffs were “not very inclined even to attempt litigation under ADA
Title III.”226 From 1992 to 1998, one study showed that 475 cases were
litigated under ADA Title I (the employment title), but only twenty-five
Title III appellate decisions were rendered during the same time period.227 The limited scope of relief available under Title III served to
protect businesses just as the Attorney General and others had hoped, but
that has changed. Today, most ADA claims are brought under Title III
due to the implementation of certain state disability laws.
As states such as California and Florida acted to fill remedial gaps
under the ADA, new opportunities to obtain damage awards in Title III
litigation followed. Today, a growing number of businesses are subjected
to ADA Title III suits.228 This increase might be considered desirable if it
were clear that: (1) the businesses sued were aware of the ADA violations, had adequate time to correct the issue, but failed to do so; and (2)
the litigation was brought on behalf of an aggrieved individual for the
primary purpose of fulfilling the goals of the ADA. In many instances,
223 Ruth Colker, ADA Title III: A Fragile Compromise, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 377,
377–78 (2000).
224 See id. at 378.
225 Id. at 384.
226 Id. at 400.
227 See id.
228 See Cory Iannacone, Follow Up: ADA Litigation Abuse Under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), RHOADS & SINON LLP (Apr. 2012), http://
www.rhoadssinon.com/updates-62.html.
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one or both of these justifications are absent.229 Although some businesses intentionally disregard clear violations of the ADA on their premises, others unintentionally run afoul of the Act.230 This is because the
broad scope of the ADA raises an almost incomprehensible number of
ways in which a plaintiff may show that the statute has been violated. In
fact, the problem is so profound that California created a new state
agency charged with providing certification training for individuals to
become state Certification Access Specialists (“CAS”).231 Because full
compliance with the ADA and state disability laws can be difficult for
businesses to achieve, some businesses hire Certified Access Specialists
to conduct an audit of its place of public accommodation and certify that
it is compliant with the ADA, as well as applicable state laws and regulations.232 The development of, and need for, this specialized field demonstrates that many businesses may not even be aware of violations on their
premises.
Opponents to the imposition of a Title III notice requirement assert
requiring a plaintiff to provide notice of a violation will serve to insulate
businesses from lawsuits and provide no corresponding benefit to aggrieved parties. Some have argued that the only meaningful way to promote compliance with the ADA is to encourage private lawsuits that seek
attorney’s fees, and that requiring notice will discourage private action.233 Proponents of a notice requirement assert that the current scheme
unfairly and unnecessarily increases litigation. Both arguments have
merit, but the current wave of fee-driven, “shotgun” Title III litigation
supports amending Title III to add a notice requirement for several
reasons.
Requiring a plaintiff to provide pre-suit notice under the ADA provides businesses acting in good faith, but in violation of the ADA, with
an opportunity to remedy the violation before being subjected to costly
litigation that, in the end, may make it impossible for the business to pay
for the changes needed to become compliant. Shotgun litigation practices
do little to ensure compliance or to cure accessibility issues. If a plaintiff’s true goal is to affect changes that lead to greater accessibility for
disabled individuals, a short notice requirement (30 days as is similar to
Title VII, not 90 days as suggested by previous proponents) imposes a
minimal hardship in view of the potential benefits that could be obtained.
229

See id.
See SoCal CASp, http://socalcasp.com/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2016).
231 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 55.52(a)(3) (2016); see also Frank W. Chen, Advising Clients
Regarding ADA Accessibility Lawsuits in California, SAN GABRIEL VALLEY BAR ASS’N (Feb.
1, 2016), http://www.sgvba.org/articles/ADA.pdf.
232 See Div. of the State Architect, http://www.dgs.ca.gov/dsa/Programs/programCert/
casp.aspx (last visited Apr. 22, 2016).
233 See Colker, supra note 223, at 400.
230
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Given that the ADA has been in effect since 1990, businesses acting in
good faith should already be in compliance with most ADA requirements. Providing businesses with a thirty-day notice period to correct
unknown violations will help ensure that effective action is taken to increase accessibility in public accommodations.
Requiring an aggrieved party to wait thirty days before filing a lawsuit imposes a burden on the individual, but provides at least three significant benefits that should be considered. First, serving notice gives many
businesses the opportunity to redirect money that would be spent in litigation toward correcting the accessibility issues identified. Second,
courts that have experienced the abusive serial ADA litigation in the past
may be less likely to dismiss such cases prematurely where there is evidence the plaintiff is acting in good faith by providing notice and an
opportunity to cure. Third, because courts retain discretion to award attorney’s fees and costs,234 courts may issue higher awards against businesses that fail to take corrective action after being properly notified of a
violation. A thirty-day notice period would also help limit any potential
backlash against individuals with disabilities that might occur if abusive
litigation is wrongly brought under the guise of helping the disabled. The
impact these types of suits will have on the general societal perspective
of individuals with disabilities is unclear, but worthy of consideration
given the long history of discrimination against the disabled community.
Thus, requiring plaintiffs to provide pre-suit notice to businesses
that are not in compliance with the ADA can serve to limit serial litigation and protect businesses from vexatious lawsuits while advancing the
underlying goals of the ADA.
CONCLUSION
The ability to profit off of the ADA and state disability laws is
troubling, but it is made worse by the reality that there is no effective
mechanism in place to ensure that the ADA violations underlying these
lawsuits are ever cured. Individuals with disabilities, and the attorneys
that represent them, must work together with public accommodations to
live up to both the letter and the spirit of the ADA.

234

See Moriarty v. Svec, 233 F.3d 955, 964 (7th Cir. 2000).

